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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is granted to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 3 and
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statement of Issues: The sole issue is whether the trial court abused its
discretion by entering a default judgment for failure of counsel to attend an
attorneys' planning conference and then refusing to set aside the default judgment.
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. "A trial court's denial of a
motion to set aside a judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is
generally reversed only for abuse of discretion. See, Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All
Am. Life Ins. Co., 978 P.2d 645." Swapp v. Swapp 2004 Ut App 192
(Memorandum Decision).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 26, 37 and 60.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appealfromthe refusal of the trial court to set aside a default
judgment entered for the failure of counsel to attend an attorneys' planning
conference.
4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. Plaintiff Ulibarri filed a complaint against defendant A-Quick on May 10,
2002, alleging that defendant, which had given an automobile secured loan in the
course of its business to plaintiff, wrongfully repossessed plaintiffs automobile
and sold the automobile in other than a commercially reasonable manner.
2. Plaintiff did not serve the complaint upon defendant, but rather on the
Secretary of the State of Utah, Division of Corporations, although defendant had a
currently registered and functioning registered agent.
3. Plaintiff then took a default judgment against defendant on July 10,
2002, however, defendant had not received any notice of the lawsuit.
4. Defendant became aware of the judgment and on November 25, 2002,
filed an answer and a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and to Quash Service
of Process, stating that plaintiff was required to serve the complaint upon
defendant's registered agent and that by failing to so do, plaintiff violated
defendant's rights to due process.
5. Over plaintiffs objection, on February 14, 2003, the trial court set aside
the default judgment, allowing the matter to proceed to trial, and defendant's
answer was accepted by the court.
6. Plaintiff then sent discovery to defendant, which defendant answered,
albeit tardily.
5

7. Before receiving defendant's responses to discovery, defendant filed a
motion to compel discovery on June 11, 2003, which discovery was produced..
8. The trial court ordered a response to the discovery and further ordered
that defendant pay attorneys' fees to plaintiff in the amount of three hundred
dollars ($300.00) and further ordered an attorneys' scheduling conference beheld
on a date certain.
9. Defendant promptly paid the three hundred dollars ($300.00) in
attorneys' fees, but failed to attend the attorneys' scheduling conference.
10. On August 28, 2003 the court calendar reads: "Filed: Notice to Submit
(Motion to enter Order dismissing and entering a judgment against the Defendant).
However, there is no notation that the motion to dismiss was filed with the court.
11. The Motion to Dismiss Answer and enter judgment against Defendant is
based upon defendant's counsel's failure to attend an attorneys' scheduling
conference ordered by the court.
12. On September 2, 2003, five days after filing the Request to Submit,
plaintiff filed the motion to enter judgment on which the Request to Submit was
premised.
13. On September 15,2003, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss the
answer and enter default judgment and ordered plaintiff to prepare Findings of
Fact.
6

13. On October 14, 2003, defendant filed a "Request for Hearing and Oral
Argument Re: Defendant's Objection to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment and Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration."
14. The Docket Entry for November 4, 2003 reads:
Filed: Cf s M.E.: Court will consider motion [for
reconsideration] pursuant to 4-501, pla has 10 days to respond,
def will have 8 days for file final reply; then submit for decision
on objection to findings & judgment.
15. The next day, November 5, 2003, plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit but
filed no response to the Motion for Reconsideration or to the Objections to the
Findings of Fact.
16. Eight days after the above minute entry was filed, i.e., on November 13,
2003, plaintiff filed "Plaintiffs Response to Objection to Defendant's Objection of
Findings of Fact."
17. The identical document was apparently filed by plaintiff on November
19,2003.
18. Following the schedule established by the Court in its November 4,
2003 entry, plaintiff timely filed its Memorandum on either November 13 or
November 19. Assuming that the November 13 Memorandum was filed, plaintiff
would have mailed its document to defendant on November 13 which is a
Thursday and given the three days for mailing assumed by the Utah Rules of Civil
7

Procedure and the intervening weekend, the document would have arrived at
defendant's attorney's office by November 17. With eight days to respond,
defendant's response was to due at the court on November 25, 2003.
19. However, the court, without the requested oral argument and without
allowing defendant the November 4 time to respond (being November 25) to
plaintiffs additional pleadings, rendered judgment adverse to defendant on
November 24, 2003
20. Defendant then filed a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment,
which was denied by the trial court on April 5, 2004. Specifically, the trial court
states:
This time, however, the defendant appears to at least recognize the
gravity of its counsel's failure to arrange a meeting or otherwise
discuss and agree upon a Scheduling Order for this case, as directed
by the Court. While this recognition is now present, the defendant
still fails to offer any credible explanation or basis for finding
excusable neglect. Instead, the defendant merely labels its counsel's
failure as "inadvertent" and proceeds to shift its focus to the issue of
whether it has a meritorious defense. . . . In this case, rather than
focusing on this threshold of establishing a reasonable basis or
excusable neglect for setting aside the default judgment, the
defendant's focus is once again misplaced to other issues such as
whether a meritorious defense exists. In the continued absence of a
reasonable excuse for defense counsel's failure, the Court determines
that there is no legal basis for setting aside the default judgment.
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court.
21. This appeal was timely taken from the above Order.
S

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The trial court abused its discretion and violated the provisions of
Rule 26(f) and Rule 37(e) by imposing the sanction of a default judgment for
failure to attend an attorneys' scheduling conference when the limit of sanctions
under the rules is an award of costs and attorneys' fees.
2. The trial court further violated the rules by imposing sanctions
under Rule 37(e) by failing to hold a required hearing.
3. Defendant has met the standard of Rule 60(b) to set aside a default
judgment by timely filing the Rule 60(b) motion, by setting out a meritorious
defense and by showing excusable neglect for the failure to attend the attorneys'
scheduling conference.
ARGUMENT
A. Statutory Basis for Claim: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26(f)
regarding a scheduling conference states as follows:
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference.
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as otherwise
stipulated or directed by order.
(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in
person or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to
discuss the possibilities for settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures
required by subdivision (a)(1), and to develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiffs
9

counsel shall schedule the meeting. The attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting
and shall attempt in good faith to agree upon the discovery plan.
(2) The plan shall include:
(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures under
subdivision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) were
made or will be made;
(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be completed,
whether discovery should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should be limited
to particular issues;
(C) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these
rules, and what other limitations should be imposed; and
(D) any other orders that should be entered by the court.
(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in
any event no more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in
conformity with the parties' stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order shall
also include each of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(l)-(6), except that the date or dates
for pretrial conferences, final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the
court or may be deferred until the close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to
the terms of a discovery plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party may
move the court for entry of a discovery order on any topic on which the parties are
unable to agree. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the presumptions established by
these rules shall govern any subject not included within the parties' stipulated discovery
plan.
(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order under Rule
16(b).

and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 37(e)
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discoveiyplan. If a party or
attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan by
agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing,
require such party or attorney to pay to any other party the reasonable expenses,
including attorney fees, caused by the failure.

and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60
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b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud,
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limn
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.

B. Analysis of the Rules: Rule 26(f) requires parties to meet together in
person or by telephone to set a plan of discovery, to discuss settlement possibilities
and to arrange for Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures. A good faith effort to agree upon a
discovery plan is required of the parties, but there is no penalty mentioned in Rule
26 for failure to attend the attorneys' scheduling conference.
The policy behind Rule 26(f) is sound, for it intends to speed the discovery
process, to eliminate the need for the court to take its time to set discovery
deadlines and disclosure requirements and to speed the case to a quicker resolution
by requiring the parties to discuss settlement possibilities.
The penaltTr for failure to attend such an attorneys' scheduling conference is
set forth in Rule 37(e) is, after a hearing by the court, the imposition of reasonable
11

expenses upon the defaulting attorney. Again, Rule 37(e) is sound, for it penalizes
an attorney for failing to participate in the attorneys' scheduling conference after a
required hearing presumably both to set a court imposed disclosure and discovery
schedule and to determine the amount of reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees.
Is the sanction of striking the defendant's answer and entering a default
judgment mentioned in the Rules? No. There also appear to be no Utah cases
interpreting or analyzing the effects of Rules 26(f) or 37(e).
Finally, Rule 60(b) is well recognized Rule permitting the setting aside of a
default judgment. There is a substantial body of case law concerning Rule 60(b).
C. Case Law: 1. Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin. 377 P.2d 189, 14 Utah
2d 60 (1962). In a prior case, Heathman filed a complaint for malpractice against
defendant law firm, Fabian & Clendenin. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the 21st day after the summons was served, but Heathman had already obtained a
default certificate on the same morning. Defendant moved to set aside the default
certificate on the grounds of excusable neglect. Extensive hearings were held
(Heathman was pro se) on issues of excusable neglect, but the end result was that
the default judgment was set aside. Later, the motion to dismiss the complaint
was granted, and on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the motion to dismiss.
12

Heathman then filed a complaint alleging, in general terms, that a number of
false affidavits were filed and that the defendant law firm had discussions with the
court which persuaded the court to set aside the default certificate obtained by
Heathman, which set aside of default judgment Heathman claimed was improper.
The Court dismissed Heathman's claims offraudon the grounds that he cited no
particular instances of fraud, only general allegations. Then the Court addressed
the issue of setting aside the default judgment:
Judgment by default are not favored by the courts nor are they
in the interest of justice and fair play. No one has an inalienable or
constitutional right to a judgment by default without a hearing on the
merits. The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where
possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits
of every case. It was clearly the duty of the law firm [defendant] to
do what it could, acting fairly and openly, to prevent the court from
entering a default judgment against Hatch without hearing its claim
that the default certificate was obtained on account of excusable
neglect. . .. The evidence clearly shows that the trial judge carefully
gave Heathman every opportunity to show that he had been
mistreated, or that there had been fraud or undue influence exerted in
the Hatch case. . . . the default in that case was set aside because of
excusable neglect in not filing the pleading in the District Court
before the close of the 3rd of January instead of placing such pleading
in the mail, which duly arrived on the next day. Id. 190, 191.
Conclusion: Default judgments are not favored by the courts and that justice
and fair play favor a full and complete hearing on the merits of every case.
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2. Heath v. Mower. 597 P.2d 855 (Utah, 1979) Heathfileda
complaint alleging fraudulent misrepresentation by Mower and obtained a
default judgment against Mower. Two months later, Mower moved to set
aside the default judgment, and the court granted the motion, allowing
Mower to file an answer and a counterclaim. Nearly two years later,
plaintiff Heath filed a notice of readiness for trial, but defendants' counsel
moved to withdraw, citing lack of contact with his client. Defendants'
attorney, as well as the court sent a number of notices to all addresses which
it had for defendants, but defendants failed to appear at the pretrial, sending
instead on the day of the pretrial a mailgram, which was not filed at the
clerk's office for another 4 days after the pretrial, asking for a continuance.
Mower's ex-wife did appear at the pretrial as she was an officer of a
corporate defendant, but the court found that she had no liability in the
matter. The court discovered that she informed Mower of the existence of
the pretrial several days prior, however, Mower did not appear and did not
contact the court excepting for the mailgram mailed on the day of the
pretrial. Based on the several notices by mail to Mower, along with the
actual notice given to him by his ex-wife, the court granted a default
judgment against defendants.

Mower then moved to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b). However, bo*1- the trial court and the Utah Supreme Court denied the
motion to set aside the judgment, pointing out that Mower had numerous
notices of the pretrial, that he made misstatements of fact in his affidavit
supporting the betting aside of the default judgment and that he could have
and should have acted sooner than the day of the pretrial.
The Supreme Court states.
While we agree that trial courts should be generally indulgent
toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so
they can be settled advisedly and in conformity with law and
justice . . . each case must nevertheless depend on its own
peculiar fact? and circumstances." Id. at 858.
In the case before us the defendant did not offer the trial court a
reasonable excuse for his nonappearance so as to bring him
under the rule that courts should liberally exercise their power
to set aside default judgment. Repeated attempts were made by
the court, by counsel for the adverse party and by Mower's own
attorney to contact him regarding the status of the lawsuit he
knew was pending. Id.
Conclusion: v* nile trial courts are generally indulgent in allowing full
inquiry into the merits of a case, the court must be offered a reasonable
excuse for nonappearance, especially when repeated attempts are made to
give notice of the pendency of the case. When a party blatantly ignores
notices from the court, the adverse party and its own attcney, the court has
discretion to disallow the motion to set aside a default j
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^ment.

3. State by & Through P. of S.S. v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053
(1983). Defendant, an attorney, misappropriated some $50,000fromhis
client and the State of Utah by forging the name of the State of Utah on a
check. The State sued and entered a default judgment against defendant.
Defendant then moved to set aside the default judgment on the grounds of
excusable neglect, stating that he had been in the hospital for a week and
was convalescing for three weeks after. The trial court denied defendant's
motion to set aside the default judgment, and defendant appealed.
The Utah Supreme Court states:
In order for defendant to be relieved from the default judgment,
he must not only show that the judgment was entered against
him through excusable neglect (or any other reason specified in
Rule 60(b)) but he must also show that his motion to set aside
the judgment was timely, and that he has a meritorious defense
to the action. Id. at 1056
The Court found that the motion to set aside was timely, being filed
within the three month period. The Court also found that there was
excusable neglect, as the trial court focused on the question of a meritorious
defense which implied that there was excusable neglect, as the question of
excusable neglect (or other 60(b) grounds) must be resolved before the
question of whether there exists a meritorious defense is considered. See.
Board of Education v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (Utah, 1963).
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However, the Court found that there was no meritorious defense
presented by Musselman, stating:
Defendant must therefore do more than merely dispute or deny
the truth of plaintiff s allegations; he must set forth specific
facts showing meritorious defenses to those allegations in order
to have the default judgment set aside. In this instance, as a
matter of law, a meritorious defense was not asserted. Id. at
1057,1058
Conclusion: While defendant met two of the three prongs necessary
to set aside a default judgment, i.e., the filing was timely (within the three
months) and there was excusable neglect (defendant was ill), the defendant's
bid to set aside the default judgment was rejected because he failed to set
forth a meritorious defense through specifically alleged facts supporting the
alleged meritorious defense.
4. Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders. 882 P.2d
1147 (Utah, 1994). Schenkers failed to respond timely to plaintiffs notice
to appoint counsel or appear in person, and the court clerk entered
Schenkers' default. Schenkers timely filed a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside
the default, and the trial court found that while, pursuant to Musselman.
supra. Schenkers met two of the three default set aside prongs (1. timeliness,
2. 60(b) excuse and 3. meritorious defense), i.e ., timeliness and excusable
neglect, he did not present a meritorious defense.
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On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court agreed that the Musselman
standards applied but that there was a meritorious defense stated, adopting
the Musselman dissenting opinion standard that a meritorious defense need
not specifically set forth "specific and sufficiently detailed facts"
Musselman. id., at 1057, but that
A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default
judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried. "Once timeliness
and a basis for relief under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure have been established, the sole issue is
whether, as a matter of law, a defendant's proposed Answer
contains a defense which is entitled to be tried." (citing
Musselman at 1059) Erickson. supra, at 1149.
In footnote 2 to the case, the court states:
Because we hold that a general denial such as the one
offered in this case is sufficient to meet the meritorious defense
requirement, it is unnecessary to reach Schenkers' claim that
the requirement is unconstitutional.
Conclusion: The Erickson court reaffirms the Musselman court's three
prong analysis, but relaxes the standard for a meritorious defense, with the
Court stating that a defense is meritorious if it sets out a defense entitling
defendant to go to trial.
5. Winward v. Carlos: 2003 UtApp 418 (Utah Court of Appeals,
Memorandum Decision, Dec 4, 2003)
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs case for plaintiffs failure to
cooperate in discovery. The standard of review by the Court of Appeals is
18

to accord the trial court broad discretion and to not disturb the decision of
the trial court absent an abuse of discretion and a likelihood that an injustice
occurred.
In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in
dismissing plaintiffs case for failure to prosecute [which, in essence is the
posture of the case at bar: defendant's attorney failed to attend a scheduling
conference and did not move the case forward: default judgment], the court
cites five factors from the case of Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W.
Larsen, 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah, 1975):
1. The conduct of both parties;
2. the opportunity each party has had to move the case forward;
3. what each of the parties has done to move the case forward;
4. what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other
side; and
5. most importantly, whether injustice may result from the dismissal.
Additionally, the Court considers the "totality of the circumstances.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the Winward case because three
years elapsed from the time of the filing of the complaint until the court
dismissed the case.
6. Morton v. Continental Baking, 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1997). In a
case examining the application of Rule 37 sanctions which involved three
continuances of trial and the plaintiffs admitted failure to respond to certain
discovery requests and several subsequent court orders to comply with the
19

discovery requests before the ultimate sanction of dismissal was granted, the
Supreme Court states:
Before a trial court can impose discovery sanctions under rule
37, the court must find on the part of the noncomplying party
willfulness, bad faith, or fault... or "persistent dilatory tactics
frustrating the judicial process." Id- at 274.
Abuse of discretion must be clearly shown and that discretion will not be
disturbed only if there is an erroneous conclusion of law or no evidentiary
basis for the trial court's ruling.
D. Application of the Rules and Case Law to the Case At Bar:
Perhaps, above all the wrangling over technicalities of the Rules
(although such technicalities are essential to the smooth operation of the
justice system) the admonition given in the above Heathman v. Fabian,
supra, should be the prevailing thought in these and all other similar
proceedings:
Judgment by default are not favored by the courts nor are they
in the interest of justice and fair play. No one has an
inalienable or constitutional right to a judgment by default
without a hearing on the merits. Heathman, supra, at 190.
The basis for the trial court's striking of defendant's answer and entry
of default judgment was defendant's counsel's failure to attend a Rule 26(f)
attorneys' scheduling conference. However, rule 26 has no penalty
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mentioned for failure to attend a scheduling conference and we must look to
rule 37(e) to determine the proper penalty. Rule 37(e) mentions only the
penalty of an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses after a
hearing. The hearing requirement is not discretionary, but part and parcel of
the rule.
However, the trial court, rather than imposing the attorney fee
requirement on defendant's counsel, went far beyond the mark and entered a
default judgment.

There was no finding by the court that defendant's

counsel was acting in bad faith or had undertaken persistent dilatory tactics
frustrating the judicial process. Indeed, the only fault of defendant's counsel
was failure to appear at one (1) hearing between the attorneys. There were
none of the repeated attempts to evoke a response which was present in the
above Heath v. Mower matter in which the default judgment was not set
aside. There is no record of repeated attempts by plaintiffs counsel or the
court to contact defendant's attorney regarding the failed attendance, nor is
there any record of prejudice, harm, bias or injustice being imposed upon
plaintiffs as a result of defendant's counsel failure to attend but one meeting.
The trial court improperly overreached the extent of Rule 37(e)
sanctions and imposed a default judgment upon defendant and then refused
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to set aside the default judgment stating that defendant's counsel failed to
meet one of the three prongs necessary to set aside a default judgment.
While defendant, in meeting the Musselman requirements, clearly filed the
Rule 60(b) motion within the three months required and clearly states a
meritorious defense, defendant, according to the trial court, did not establish
excusable neglect for failure to appear at the one meeting between the
attorneys.
However, because the sanction of a default judgment was wrongfully
imposed, which sanction for missing but one hearing is limited to costs and
fees, defendant's counsel's actions in failing to attend the one (1) attorney
scheduling meeting are excusable. Little did defendant's counsel know that
the trial court would forge new law by imposing a default judgment for
failure to attend the scheduling conference, thereby establishing a
significantly higher and more harsh standard for performance than hitherto
required of litigating attorneys.
Believing that the maximum sanction would be a fine for costs and
fees, however substantial, defendant's counsel would not have given the
substantial and case decisive impact to the attorneys' scheduling conference
as the trial court later placed upon the simple telephonic meeting. Thus, the
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failure of defendant's counsel to promptly attend the conference was
excusable, he not knowing the overriding importance of the attorneys
scheduling conference.
CONCLUSION
The trial court overreached its ability to impose sanctions for the
failure of defendant's counsel to attend the first and only established time for
an attorneys5 scheduling conference. On such grounds, the decision of the
trial court to impose the default judgment should be set aside.
The default judgment should further be set aside on the grounds that
all the requirements of a Rule 60(b) setting aside of a default judgment have
been met in that the motion to set aside was timely filed, defendant has
presented a meritorious defense and it was excusable neglect for defendant's
attorney to fail to appear at the scheduling conference because of the
substantially higher sanctions imposed by the trial court judge on such
failure to appear than was previously allowed by the applicable Rule 37(e).
Theref re, this matter should be remanded to the trial court to allow
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this matter to proceed to trial on the merits.
Dated this 13th day of October, 2004.

ROBERT D. ROSE
Attorney for Appellant
PROOF OF SERVICE
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief to:
Randall Gaither
159 West

300 South

Suite 105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

on the 14m day of October, 2004.
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ADDENDUM
Minute Entry and Order, April 5, 2004

FILB

Bisrsse? mum

Third Judicial District

APR - b 2SM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELEANOR ULIBARRI and
VICTOR HORROCKS,

:

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

:

CASE NO.

020904009

Plaintiffs,
VS.

A-QUICK TITLE LOANS, INC.,
Defendant.

:

The Court has before it a request for decision filed by the
plaintiffs seeking a ruling on the defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion to
Set Aside Judgment.

Having reviewed the defendant's Motion, the

plaintiffs' Opposition and the defendant's final reply, the Court
concludes that the Motion is not well-taken and is therefore
denied.
Specifically, the defendant's Motion to Set Aside is another
in a series of Motions and Objections filed by the defendant aimed
at obtaining a reconsideration of this Court's prior decision to
strike the defendant's Answer and enter default judgement against
it.

This time, however, the defendant appears to at least

recognize the gravity of its counsel's failure to arrange a meeting
or otherwise discuss and agree upon a Scheduling Order for this
case, as directed by the Court.

While this recognition is now

present, the defendant still fails to offer any credible

ULIBARRI V.
A-QUICK TITLE

PAGE 2
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explanation or basis for finding excusable neglect.

Instead, the

defendant merely labels its counsel's failure as "inadvertent" and
proceeds to shift its focus to the issue of whether it has a
meritorious defense.

This despite the defendant's reliance on a

litany of cases which require there to be a reasonable basis or
"excuse" for the courts "to exercise their power to set aside
default judgment."

Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979).

In

this case, rather than focusing on this threshold of establishing
a reasonable basis or excusable neglect for setting aside the
default judgment, the defendant's focus is once again misplaced to
other issues such as whether a meritorious defense exists. In the
continued absence of a reasonable excuse for defense counsel's
failure, the Court determines that there is no legal basis for
setting aside the default judgment.

The defendant's Motion is

therefore denied.
This Minute Entry decision wil/C stand as the Order of the
Court, denying the defendant's Mot/ion to Set Aside Default.

I **_
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry and Order, to the following, this_D_
of April, 2004:

Randall Gaither
Attorney for Plaintiff
159 West 300 South, Suite 105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Nathan Drage
Attorney for Defendant
4766 S. Holladay Blvd.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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